David L. Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven K. Jensen, Kevin J. Jensen : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2000
David L. Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management,
Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven K.
Jensen, Kevin J. Jensen : Brief of Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
James C. Haskins; Thomas N. Thompson; Haskins and Associates, P.C.; Attorneys for Appellees.
David W. Scofield; David J. Burns; Parsons, Davies, Kinghorn and Peters; Attorneys for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, David L. Orlob v. Wasatch Medical Management, Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven K. Jensen, Kevin J. Jensen,
No. 20000987 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2000).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/2988
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee 
vs. 
WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, 
a Utah general partnership, 
KENNETH C. JENSEN, individually 
and as a general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, EARLENE B. 
JENSEN, individually and as general 
partner of Wasatch Medical Management, 
STEVEN K. JENSEN, individually and as 
general partner of Wasatch Medical 
Management, and KEVEN J. JENSEN, 
individually and as general partner of 
Wasatch Medical Management, 
Defendants, Appellees, and 
Cross-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES AND CROSS APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE ._. FILED 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, W Court<*Appeals 
HON. WILLIAM B. BOHLING, MAY 2 3 2001 
DATED NOVEMBER 6, 2000 GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES ON Alette Stagg 
APPELLANTS CLAIMS, AND DENYING Ck*k«**» Court 
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
David W. Scofield James C. Haskins 
David J. Burns Thomas N. Thompson 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants Attorneys for Appellees 
Court of Appeals No. 
20000987-CA 
Case No. 910901061CN 
Priority No. 15 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, Appellant, 
and Cross-Appellee 
vs." 
WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, 
a Utah general partnership, 
KENNETH C. JENSEN, individually 
and as a general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, EARLENE B. 
JENSEN, individually and as general 
partner of Wasatch Medical Management, 
STEVEN K. JENSEN, individually and as 
general partner of Wasatch Medical 
Management, and KEVEN J. JENSEN, 
individually and as general partner of 
Wasatch Medical Management, 
Defendants, Appellees, and 
Cross-Appellants. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEES AND CROSS APPELLANTS 
APPEAL FROM THE FINAL JUDGMENT OF THE 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, 
HON. WILLIAM B. BOHLING, 
DATED NOVEMBER 6, 2000 GRANTING 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEES ON 
APPELLANTS CLAIMS, AND DENYING 
APPELLEE'S MOTION FOR ATTORNEY FEES 
David W. Scofield James C. Haskins 
David J. Burns Thomas N. Thompson 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellants Attorneys for Appellees 
Court of Appeals No. 
20000987-CA 
Case No. 910901061CN 
Priority No. 15 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
JURISDICTION 1 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 1 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 7 
ARGUMENT 7 
A. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled That There Is No Genuine 
Issue as to Any Material Fact Related to the Parties' Contract and 
That the Defendants were entitled to Judgment as a Matter 
of Law 7 
B. The Trial Court Correctly Held as a Matter of Law That the 
Plaintiffs Motion For Summary Judgment Should Be Denied 12 
C. The Trial Court Erred in Holding that the Defendants Could 
Not Recover Their Attorney Fees as Prevailing Parties Herein 13 
CONCLUSION 15 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 17 
ADDENDUM 1 Motion for Order Allowing Costs and Attorney Fees 
ADDENDUM 2 Amended Complaint 
- i -
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 382 (1893) 8 
Cluffv. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976) 14 
Commercial National Bank v. Chambers, 61 P. 560 (Utah 1900), 
affirmed, 182 U.S. 556 (1904) 11 
DesertMiriah, Inc. v. B&LAuto, Inc., 12 
First General Services v. Perkins, 918 P.2d 480, 488 (Utah App. 1996) 15 
Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah App. 1994) 14 
Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah App. 1987) 9 
Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171, 178 (Utah App. 2000) 12 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 617 P.2d 406 
(Utah 1980) 15 
Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah App. 1998) 8 
Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082, 1085 (Utah 1983) 14 
Young Farms, Ltd. v. Richtron, Inc., 776 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1989) 11 
Statutes Page 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 2,13,14 
ii-
JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal and cross-appeal herein pursuant to 
UTAH CODE ANN §§78-2-2(3)0), 78-2-2(4), and 78-2a-3(2)(j) 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1 Whether the District Court properly held as a matter of law that the 
Plaintiff had no separately cognizable interest in the agreement entered into by the 
parties herein and Professional's Control Group, Inc , a corporation wholly owned by 
him and in which he was the President 
Standard of Review The grant of a motion for summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness llott v University of Utah, 12 P 3d 1011 (Utah App 2000) 
2 Whether the District Court properly denied the Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment 
Standard of Review The grant of a motion for summary judgment is 
reviewed for correctness llott v University of Utah, 12 P 3d 1011 (Utah App 2000) 
3 Whether the District Court properly denied the Defendants' motion for 
attorney fees as the prevailing parties 
Standard of Review An award or attorney fees, or refusal to award 
attorney fees, is reviewable for patent error or clear abuse of discretion See Valcarce 
v Fitzgerald, 961 P 2d 305 (Utah 1998) This issue was preserved for appeal by the 
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filing of motion for attorney fees with the District Court, which motion was denied in the 
Court's Order dated November 6, 2000. 
APPLICABLE STATUTES 
The Court's interpretation of the following statutory provision may be 
determinative of the attorney fee issue on this appeal: 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 provides as follows: 
Attorney's Fees — Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party 
to recovery attorney's fees. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves a contract dispute among the parties to a written contract 
included as Appendix A to the Brief of Appellant. Pursuant to that executory contract, 
all of the assets of Professional's Control Group, Inc. ("PCG"), were sold to the 
Defendants herein on August 31, 1988. At the time of the sale, the Plaintiff was the 
President and sole shareholder of PCG. (Finding of Fact No. 1, Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, Appendix G to Brief of Appellant.) 
After significant discovery, the parties filed cross motions for summary judgment. 
Therein, the Plaintiff asserted that he owned an interest in the contract which was 
separately cognizable from the interest of the corporate entity which he owned and 
managed. The Defendants argued that the corporation itself was the only owner of any 
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asset of the corporation and that upon their purchase from the Internal Revenue 
Service of the corporation's interest in that contract, they had no obligation to pay the 
Defendant any amount under the terms of the contract. 
The District Court, examining the four comers of the contract itself, concluded 
that whatever interest the Plaintiff had in the contract, if any, was not severable from his 
interest as President and sole shareholder of PCG. Consequently, the Court granted 
the Defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiff's motion for 
summary judgment. 
Paragraph 21 of the contract (Appendix A, Brief of Appellant) provides that the 
"[p]arties further acknowledge that in the event of a default the non-defaulting party 
shall be entitled to all costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to enforce the terms 
and conditions of this Agreement against the defaulting party." The defendants sought 
an award of attorney fees pursuant to this provision, which motion for attorney fees 
was denied by the Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts found by the District Court in ruling on the parties' motion for summary 
judgment (Appendix G, Brief of Appellant), none of which has been challenged by the 
Plaintiff, are as follows: 
1. In 1988, Plaintiff Orlob was the sole shareholder and President of 
Physician's Control Group, Inc. (hereinafter "PCG"), a Utah corporation performing 
Page 3 
billing services on behalf of physicians primarily located in the Salt Lake City, Utah, 
metropolitan area. 
2. Also during 1988, the individual Defendants were partners in a Utah 
general partnership known as Wasatch Medical Management, which performed billing 
services on behalf of physicians primarily located in the Ogden, Utah, metropolitan 
area. 
3. On August 31, 1988, the parties entered into a contract (the "Combined 
Agreement") for the purchase by Defendants of all of the assets of PCG. The 
Combined Agreement identified the parties as follows: 
This agreement is made between two groups, namely: PROFESSIONAL'S 
CONTROL GROUP, INC., its principal shareholder David L. Orlob, 
hereinafter collectively referred to as "Orlob," and WASATCH MEDICAL 
MANAGEMENT, A PARTNERSHIP, whose principal partners are Kenneth 
C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven K. Jensen and Keven J. Jensen, 
hereinafter collectively referred to as "Jensens." 
4. The Combined Agreement, effective as of August 1, 1988, provided for 
the transfer to the Defendants of all of the physical assets of PCG as well as the 
transfer of all of the contracts between PCG and the physicians for whom PCG formerly 
provided billing services. These transfers represented all of the assets of PCG. The 
stock of PCG was not purchased, and remained in the hands of Plaintiff Orlob. 
5. In consideration for the transfer of the physical assets of PCG to the 
Defendants, the Combined Agreement provided for payment to PCG and Plaintiff Orlob, 
collectively, of $15,000.00, payable $7,500.00 on or before September 25, 1988, and 
$7,500.00 on or before October 25, 1988. 
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6. In consideration for the transfer of the contracts between PCG and the 
physicians for whom PCG formerly provided billing services, the Combined Agreement 
provided for payments of commissions to PCG and Plaintiff Orlob, collectively, of 
certain monthly commissions, the amount of which varied depending on the number of 
physicians who retained Defendants' services and other factors. The commission 
period commenced October 1, 1988 and was to terminate on July 31, 1994. 
7. The Combined Agreement also provided that Orlob and PCG collectively 
warranted that they would assist in the orderly transfer of all accounts to the 
Defendants and assist them in maintaining the accounts over the life of the Combined 
Agreement. 
8. The Combined Agreement also provided that Orlob and PCG, collectively, 
would not compete directly or indirectly in Utah against or adverse to the Defendants in 
the billing and collection service for a period of ten years commencing August 1, 1988. 
9. The Combined Agreement also provided that Orlob and PCG warranted, 
collectively, that all listed anesthesiologists' accounts "must be willing to pay 6% of total 
collections for services rendered." 
10. Following execution by the parties of the Combined Agreement, Plaintiff 
Orlob did not conduct any further business on behalf of PCG; nor did he file any further 
annual reports with the Secretary of State. In or about February, 1990, PCG was 
involuntarily dissolved by the State of Utah for failure to file its annual report. 
11. Plaintiff Orlob moved to Los Angeles, California, in or about October, 
1989. 
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12. At some point in 1990, Defendants were contacted by telephone by 
representatives of the Internal Revenue Service seeking the whereabouts of Plaintiff 
Orlob with respect to past due taxes owed by PCG. On October 5, 1990, Defendant 
Kenneth C. Jensen wrote to Plaintiff Orlob, advising him that the !RS had "been trying 
to get with you for quite some time now;" that the Defendants were legally bound to pay 
amounts due under the Combined Agreement to the IRS; and that the IRS had the 
power to "seize and sell" PCG's interest in the Combined Agreement to get past due 
taxes owed by PCG paid immediately. 
13. The IRS served a notice of levy on the Defendants with respect to the 
payments due from the physicians under the Combined Agreement and, commencing 
October 19, 1990, payments otherwise due to be paid by the Defendants under the 
Combined Agreement were paid over to the IRS instead. None of the amounts paid 
over to the IRS were ever reimbursed to the Defendants by Plaintiff Orlob. 
14. Subsequently, the IRS seized the payments due under the Combined 
Agreement and sold the "right, title, and interest" of PCG in the Combined Agreement 
at a public sale held on December 10, 1990. The Defendants purchased the "right, 
title, and interest" of PCG at that sale for $9,406.31. None of the amounts paid over to 
the IRS in connection with that sale were ever reimbursed to the Defendants by Plaintiff 
Orlob. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
I. The trial court correctly held as a matter of law that the Plaintiff, 
individually, had no interest in the contract. 
The contract as written cannot be read to create any rights in Plaintiff Orlob 
separate and apart from the rights of PCG, the corporation he wholly owned and 
managed. 
II. The trial court correctly held as a matter of law that the Plaintiffs motion 
for summary judgment should be denied. 
The contract as written clearly demonstrates that the Plaintiff's individual interest 
in PCG, if any, is co-extensive with the rights of PCG itself, and not separately 
cognizable. 
III. The trial court erred in declining to award the Defendants their attorney 
fees as the prevailing parties below. 
The court is authorized to award such fees because they are provided for in 
paragraph 21 of the contract itself, and because UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5 provides 
for such an award under the circumstances of this case. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW THAT 
THE PLAINTIFF, INDIVIDUALLY, HAD NO SEPARATELY 
COGNIZABLE INTEREST IN THE CONTRACT. 
The Appellant argues for reversal of the Court below by suggesting that the 
District Court "placed exclusive reliance on the introductory paragraph of the Combined 
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Agreement to conclude that Orlob is not an individual party." (Brief of Appellant at 13.) 
Preliminarily, there is nothing in the record to support this assertion. As the Plaintiff 
concedes, however, references throughout the contract to "Orlob" are, by the terms of 
that introductory paragraph, invariably to be treated as collective references to Plaintiff 
Orlob and PCG. The Plaintiff is simply wrong in arguing that there can have been no 
useful purpose in referring to Orlob and purporting to impose personal obligations on 
him. This argument ignores the District Court's conclusion of law, which is beyond 
challenge, that "[a] corporation is capable of action only through the efforts of its 
officers or agents, and Plaintiff Orlob was such an officer and agent for purposes of the 
Combined Agreement." (Appendix G, Brief of Appellant, Conclusion of Law No. 2) 
See, e.g., Baltimore & Ohio Railway v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 382 (1893), quoted in 
Reedeker v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577 (Utah App. 1998) ("a corporation acts through 
agents" and "directors are the managing agents"). It is abundantly clear from the 
contract itself that Plaintiff Orlob was included as a separate signatory so that some 
person would be required to undertake the obligations of the corporate entity. There, 
were no other shareholders. (Appendix G, Brief of Appellant, Finding of Fact No. 1) 
There was a president, who was the Plaintiff. (Appendix G, Brief of Appellant, Finding 
of Fact No. 1) There is nothing in the record to suggest that there were any other 
officers or directors. Had the contract failed to bind Orlob individually to perform the 
terms of the contract on behalf of PCG, the Defendants could not, as a practical matter, 
have enforced any of the terms of that contract. 
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The Plaintiff has been unable to identify any provision of the contract which 
purports to bind him only in his individual capacity as distinct from his capacity as the 
president and sole shareholder of PCG. The Plaintiff speculates that the Defendants 
"would have . . . sued" Orlob had he personally violated the covenant not to compete 
contained in the contract, but such speculation does not address the fundamental 
question whether Orlob's interest in the agreement was somehow separable from 
PCG's interest and, if so, how the respective interests of Orlob and PCG should be 
allocated. 
Where parties fail to bind corporate officers as well as the corporation itself, 
difficulties obviously may arise. In Horman v. Gordon, 740 P.2d 1346 (Utah App. 
1987), for example, a corporate officer had bound a company on a promissory note but 
the obligee had failed to bind the corporate officer directly, and the company then went 
out of business. The result was that, by the time the case went to trial, no one had any 
liability on the note. It was no doubt to avoid a similar result that the parties herein 
determined to bind themselves individually to the terms of the contract on behalf of the 
entities they represented. 
The difficulty with the Plaintiffs position is that he is unable to identify in any 
fashion the manner in which his alleged interest in the contract and PCG's interest in 
the contract should be allocated. That is, having admitted that the Defendants 
purchased all of PCG's interest in the contract and owed no further obligation to PCG, 
the Plaintiff now asserts that it is only he himself who had any interest in the contract at 
all, and that PCG had nothing. For the Plaintiff asserts as damages herein at least the 
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full amount of all payments which were due to be paid under the contract, which 
payments terminated after the Defendants purchased PCG's interest in the contract at 
an IRS sale. If this was to be the intended result, why is PCG a party to the contract at 
all? As the District Court found, it is PCG who owned the physician contracts 
purchased by the defendants (Appendix G, Brief of Appellant, Finding of Fact No. 4) 
and as to which the Defendants made payments to the owner of PCG — the Plaintiff. In 
effect, the Plaintiff is inviting this court to ignore the existence of the very corporation 
he himself formed. The court should reject any such result. The Defendants have 
located no reported case wherein a party has been permitted to "pierce the corporate 
veil" of his own corporate entity. 
The Plaintiff implicitly advances the bizarre argument that the Defendants are in 
effect liable twice for the same payments — once in favor of the corporation, and again 
in favor of the Plaintiff individually. Such an argument does not withstand scrutiny. 
In effecting the purchase transaction under the contract, the Defendants did not 
purchase the Plaintiff's stock in PCG, but instead effected an asset purchase. 
(Appendix G, Brief of Appellant, Findings of Fact Nos. 4 through 6.) It is beyond 
dispute that the Plaintiff did not own those assets; instead, he owned only the corporate 
stock. Thus, following the sale of the corporate assets to the Defendants, the 
corporation had the right to receive payments from the Defendants for those assets. 
Those payments were made to the Plaintiff, not because he had any direct ownership 
interest in the assets themselves, which he did not, but because he was PCG's 
President and sole owner of the stock. Ownership of corporate stock represents "not 
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an indebtedness due the owner, but simply an interest in the assets or property of the 
corporation. Commercial National Bank v. Chambers, 61 P. 560 (Utah 1900), affirmed, 
182 U.S. 556 (1904). Corporate property is vested in the corporation itself and not in 
the shareholders. Id. Once the contract was executed, the Defendants owned the 
corporate furnishings, the corporate equipment, and the physician contracts. The 
corporation owned the executory right to the payments due under the contract. 
Subsequently, when the IRS levied upon the executory right to payment under the 
contract, the Defendants properly paid amounts due under the contract to the IRS. 
When the IRS then seized all "right, title and interest of PCG in the contract, the effect 
was to seize any interest in the sole remaining asset, the executory right to payment. 
See Young Farms, Ltd. v. Richtron, Inc., 776 P.2d 53, 56 (Utah 1989). As a matter of 
law, therefore, the Plaintiff has no separately identifiable right to payment under the 
contract. 
The Plaintiff suggests that there are no cases holding that a shareholder may 
not be paid individually for a covenant not to compete. The Defendants have no 
quarrel with this general proposition; however, it has no applicability to this case, since 
the covenant not to compete in the instant case plainly and by its express terms bound 
both the Plaintiff and PCG. 
The Plaintiff also suggests that, in making their checks payable to Orlob rather 
than PCG, the parties by their course of conduct have acknowledged that payments 
under the contract were to Plaintiff Orlob in his individual capacity. While it is true that 
the checks were made payable to Orlob, there is nothing in the record to suggest this 
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was done for the purpose of acknowledging any separate interest Orlob had in the 
contract. Rather, Orlob's status as the sole owner of PCG suggests he is an 
appropriate payee of amounts due under the contract to PCG, particularly since PCG 
itself was for much of the period during which payments were due in inactive status. 
For the reasons set forth above, the District Court's granting of the Defendants' 
motion for summary judgment should be affirmed. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY HELD AS A MATTER OF LAW 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
SHOULD BE DENIED. 
The Plaintiff suggests, contrary to the findings of the Court below, that the 
contract unambiguously treats Plaintiff as an individual party to its terms. In fact, what 
the contract unambiguously shows is that the Plaintiffs obligations under the contract 
are, in every instance, obligations on behalf of PCG. Both PCG and Plaintiff were 
expressly bound by the terms of the contract, because a corporation cannot act 
otherwise than through its agents, as discussed above. 
In advancing this argument, the Plaintiff misconceives his burden on appeal. 
The District Court's factual findings will not be disturbed unless it can be shown that 
those findings are clearly erroneous. Desert Miriah, Inc. v. B &L Auto, Inc., 12 P.3d 
580, 582 (Utah 2000). Here, the Plaintiff has fallen woefully short of any such showing. 
Instead of marshaling the evidence in support of the Court's ruling, he has simply 
reargued his view of the evidence. This is insufficient to meet his burden of showing 
that the Court's findings below are clearly erroneous. Kelley v. Kelley, 9 P.3d 171,178 
(Utah App. 2000). 
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III. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO AWARD THE 
DEFENDANTS THEIR ATTORNEY FEES AS PREVAILING PARTIES IN 
THIS CASE. 
The Court below denied the Defendants Motion for Order Allowing Costs and 
Attorney Fees upon the ground that there is no statutory or contractual right to the 
same. (Appendix C, Brief of Appellant) The Court erred in that the Defendants' right to 
recover such fees is provided both by statute and by the contract which is the subject of 
this action. 
In the Defendants' motion (Addendum 1, attached) the Defendants argued that 
they should be allowed their attorney fees based upon the provisions of UTAH CODE 
ANN. § UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5, which provides as follows: 
Attorney's Fees — Reciprocal rights to recover attorney's fees. 
A court may award costs and attorney's fees to either party that 
prevails in a civil action based upon any promissory note, written contract, 
or other writing executed after April 28, 1986, when the provisions of the 
promissory note, written contract, or other writing allow at least one party 
to recover attorney's fees. 
The contract of the parties, executed by them on August 31, 1988, provides, in 
paragraph 22, as follows: 
Parties further acknowledge that in event of a default the non-
defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs, including reasonable 
attorney fees, to enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement 
against the defaulting party. 
(Appendix A, Brief of Appellant) 
This suit was commenced by the Plaintiff on a claim alleging a default of the 
Defendants' performance under the contract. Count II of the Amended Complaint 
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(Addendum 2, attached) asserts, in paragraph 18, that "Defendants have defaulted in 
their payment of monies under the Agreement and, as of the date of this complaint, are 
indebted to Orlob in the amount not less than Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars 
($450,000), or such other and greater amounts as may be proven at trial." 
In paragraph 19 of the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiff quotes the operative 
language of paragraph 21 of the contract regarding payment of attorney fees, and 
further asserts a right to attorney fees based on that provision. The contract expressly 
allows "the non-defaulting party," to recover their legal fees, and the Defendants herein 
are clearly such non-defaulting parties. Further, the contract as written allows "at least 
one party to recover attorney fees." Under these circumstances, it is clear that the 
Defendants are entitled to recover reasonable attorney fees pursuant to the terms of 
their contract and pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-27-56.5. 
The general principal of law cited by the District Court is no doubt correct. That 
is, attorney fees are not generally allowable except when authorized by statute or the 
express terms of a contract. See, e.g., Cluffv. Culmer, 556 P.2d 498 (Utah 1976); 
Holbrook v. Master Protection Corp., 883 P.2d 295 (Utah App. 1994). Here, however, 
such fees are allowable both in the contract between the parties and pursuant to the 
cited statute. Provisions in written contracts providing for the payment of attorney fees 
should ordinarily be honored by the courts. Soffe v. Ridd, 659 P.2d 1082,1085 (Utah 
1983). 
Under these circumstances, it is respectfully submitted that the Court's refusal to 
award reasonable attorney fees is an abuse of discretion, and this case should be 
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remanded to permit the Court to determine the amount of such reasonable fees The 
Defendants submitted evidence of the amount of their fees in their motion, see 
Addendum 1, attached, but the District Court failed to reach the issue of the 
reasonableness of those fees, finding instead that no provision of the contract or 
applicable law provided for such fees (On remand, the District Court should consider 
the reasonableness of the fees based upon the standards set forth in First General 
Services, v Perkins, 918 P 2d 480, 488 (Utah App 1996)) 
Provision for attorney fees contained in a contract also includes attorney fees 
incurred by the prevailing party on appeal, Management Services Corp v 
Development Associates, 617 P 2d 406 (Utah 1980), and, should the Defendants 
prevail on this appeal, they should also be awarded their attorney fees for defending 
this appeal 
CONCLUSION 
For all of the foregoing reasons, the decision of the trial court should be 
sustained with respect to the Defendants' motion for summary judgment, sustained with 
respect to the denial of the Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, and reversed and 
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remanded with respect to the trial court's failure to award attorney fees to the 
Defendants. 
DATED this 23rd day of May, 2001. 
/(fevAl/i 
James C. Kaskins 
ttorney for uefjfendants 
\U*u M l ) 
Thomas N. Tnbmpsd>n 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused two true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF 
OF APPELLEES AND CROSS-APPELLANTS to be delivered by first class mail, 
postage prepaid, to the following, this 23rd day of May, 2001: 
David W. Scofield, Esq. 
David J. Burns, Esq. 
PARSONS, DAVIS, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Appellant David L Orlob 
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ADDENDUM 1 
James C. Haskins (#1406) 
Thomas N. Thompson (#3243) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2827 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, 
a Utah general partnership 
KENNETH C. JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, EARLENE B. 
JENSEN, individually and as 
general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, STEVEN 
K. JENSEN, individually and 
as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, and 
KEVEN J. JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner of 
Wasatch Medical Management, 
Defendants. 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
ALLOWING COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Civil No. 910901061CN 
Judge William B. Bohling 
The Defendants, by and through their undersigned counsel, move the Court for 
an Order allowing them their costs and attorney fees incurred in the above action. 
In support thereof, there is submitted herewith the Affidavit of James C. Haskins, 
together with a supporting memorandum. 
DATED this 5TH day of July, 2000. 
/ y JAMES C. HASKINS 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Motion for Order Allowing Costs and 
Attorney Fees was served on the 5TH day of July, 2000, by mailing the same in a 
U.S. Postal Service postage paid envelope addressed as follows: 
David W. Scofield 
David J. Burns 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/S/THOMAS N. THOMPSON 
Thomas N. Thompson 
Page 3 
James C. Haskins (#1406) 
Thomas N. Thompson (#3243) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2827 
Telephone: (801)539-0234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, 
a Utah general partnership 
KENNETH C. JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, EARLENE B. 
JENSEN, individually and as 
general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, STEVEN -
K. JENSEN, individually and 
as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, and 
KEVEN J. JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner of 
Wasatch Medical Management, 
AFFIDAVIT OF JAMES C. 
HASKINS IN SUPPORT OF 
MOTION FOR ORDER 
ALLOWING COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Civil No. 910901061CN 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendants. 
ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
I, James C. Haskins, an individual above the age of 21 years, hereby depose 
and state as follows: 
1. I am one of the attorneys for the Defendants in the above entitled matter, 
and I am competent to testify regarding the costs and attorney fees incurred in the 
above-entitled case. 
2. I was admitted to the practice of law in the State of Utah on April 30, 
1980, and have been an active member of the Utah State Bar since that date. I am 
also admitted to practice law in the State of California, in the United States District 
Court for the District of Utah, and in the United States District Court for the District of 
Colorado. In my practice, I specialize in the areas of commercial and business 
litigation, domestic and family law, and federal bankruptcy law. 
3. My agreement with the Defendants in this case was to provide legal 
services in defense of the claims of the Plaintiff for an agreed hourly rate of $150.00 an 
hour. I have represented the Defendants in this litigation since the Plaintiff first 
instituted suit against them in 1991. 
4. My associate, Thomas N. Thompson, assisted me in this litigation. Mr. 
Thompson is known to me to have been in the continuous practice of law as an active 
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member of the Utah State Bar since September, 1975. 
5. The following costs and attorney fees have been incurred by the 
Defendants in defending this action: 
Date 
| 03-13-91 
| 01-25-93 
02-10-93 
01-27-93 
01-27-93 
02-10-93 
06-28-93 
08-05-93 
08-17-93 
11-02-93 
11-20-93 
Hrs. 
1.1 
1.3 
0.5 
2.4 
0.5 
0.1 
0.1 
0.5 
0.5 
1.0 
Activity 
Review Summons and Complaint 
Review Amended Complaint; confer w/Clients 
Review Plaintiff's First Set of Discovery 
(Documents, Interrogs.) 
Prepare, File Answer and Counterclaim 
Counterclaim Fee 
Review Plaintiffs First Set of Interrogatories Dated 
February 10, 1993 
Review Ltr. fr. Plaintiffs attorney, Ronald F. Price 
Review Ltr. fr. Plaintiffs attorney, Ronald F. Price 
Review Plaintiffs Motion to Compel Discovery 
Responses 
Review Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of Motion 
for Summary Judgment as to Liability on Plaintiffs 
Claims 
Review Plaintiffs Motion to Strike Portions of the 
Affidavit of Steve Jensen; and Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Opp. to Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiffs 
Motion to Strike Defendants' Memorandum 
Opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment 
Amount 
165.00 
195.00 
75.00 
360.00 
90.00 
75.00 I 
15.00 | 
15.00 | 
75.00 I 
75.00 I 
150.00 
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11-29-93 
I 11-29-93 
I 12-06-93 
I 12-06-93 
12-06-93 
12-13-93 
12-13-93 
12-15-93 
I 12-22-93 
01-04-94 
1.6 
0.25 
4.5 
5.8 
0.2 
3.0 
4.6 
5.5 
0.5 
0.4 
Prepare, File Motion for Extension of Time to 
Respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Prepare, File Correction to Motion for Extension of 
Time to Respond to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment 
Prepare, File Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment and Request for Hearing 
Prepare, File Defendants' Memorandum in 
Opposition to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Support of Defendants' Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
Prepare, File Proposed Order Extending Time (For 
Response to Plaintiffs Motion for Summary 
Judgment) 
Prepare, Serve Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs 
First Set of Interrogatories 
Prepare, Serve Defendants' Answers to Plaintiffs 
Request for Production of Documents 
Prepare, File Defendants' Memorandum in 
Response to Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to Compel 
Discovery Answers 
Review Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Further 
Support of Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to Compel 
Discovery Responses 
Prepare, File Notice of Hearing re Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment, Defendant's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, Plaintiffs Renewed Motion to 
Compel Discovery Responses, Plaintiffs Motion to 
Strike Portions of Steve Jensen's Affidavit, i 
Defendant's Motion to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim 
240.00 
NC I 
675.00 I 
870.00 I 
30.00 I 
450.00 I 
690.00 I 
825.00 
75.00 I 
60.00 I 
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02-14-94 
02-16-94 
02-15-94 
02-18-94 
02-24-94 
02-28-94 
03-03-94 
03-15-94 
03-17-94 
04-07-99 
[ 04-18-94 
|06-22-94 
| 06-28-94 
07-18-94 
06-05-98 
1.0 
0.1 
2.2 
4.b 
0.1 
0.5 
0.25 
0.1 
1.25 
0.75 
4.1 
0.75 
0.25 
1.0 
.75 
Attend hearing before Judge Rokich on Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment; Defendant's Motion 
for Summary Judgment; Plaintiffs Renewed Motion 
to Compel Discovery Responses; Plaintiffs Motion 
to Strike Portions of Steve Jensen's Affidavit; and 
Defendants' Motion to Amend Answer and 
Counterclaim 
Prepare, Serve Notice of Deposition of David L. 
Orlob 
Prepare, Serve Amended Answer and Counterclaim 
Review Discovery, Prepare, Serve, Defendants 
Answers to Plaintiffs Request For Production of 
Documents 
Prepare, Serve Notice of Deposition of David L. 
Orlob 
Prepare, Serve Order on 2/14/94 Hearing 
Review David L. Orlob's Reply to Amended 
Counterclaim 
Review Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Notice of 
Deposition 
Depose Plaintiff Orlob 
Attend Scheduling Conference 
Prepare, Serve Trial Memorandum 
Review Plaintiffs Evidentiary Hearing Memorandum 
Prepare, File, Notice of Continuance of Hearing 
Prepare for, attend Hearing on interest of Plaintiff in 
Combined Agreement 
Attend Plaintiffs Deposition of Earlene B. Jensen 
T50.00 I 
15.00 I 
330.00 | 
675.00 I 
15.00 I 
75.00 | 
37.50 I 
15.00 I 
187.50 | 
112.50 I 
615.00 J 
112.50 ] 
37.50 | 
150.00 I 
112.50 | 
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| 06-05-98 
06-05-98 
| 06-05-98 
11-06-98 
12-04-98 
04-07-99 
04-12-99 
04-15-99 
04-23-99 
05-03-99 
05-21-99 
05-27-99 
06-01-99 
06-01-99 
07-30-99 
08-19-99 
4.6 
1.6 
1.5 
0.1 
.25 
1 0 
1 5 
9.0 
3.5 
0.25 
0.5 
1.0 
1.5 
.25 
1.5 
0.5 
Attend Plaintiffs Deposition of Keven J. Jensen 
Attend Plaintiffs Deposition of Steven K. Jensen 
Attend Plaintiffs Deposition of Kenneth C. Jensen 
Request Scheduling Conference 
Review of Complaint and FAX to Client 
Pretrial Hearing w/Judge Bohling 
Review of File 
Prepare, Serve, Defendants' First Set of 
Interrogatories; Defendants' Requests For 
Admissions; and Defendants' First Request for 
Production of Documents 
Prepare, Serve, Defendants' Second Request for 
Production of Documents 
Review Plaintiffs Witness List 
Review Plaintiffs Responses to Defendants' First 
Request for Production of Documents; and Plaintiffs 
Responses to Defendants' Second Request for 
Production of Documents 
Review Plaintiffs May 27, 1999 Interrogatories to 
Defendants; Plaintiffs May 27, 1999 Request for 
Production of Documents to Defendants 
Prepare, Serve Defendant's Witness List 
Review of FAX and phone consult w/Clients 
Attendance at Pretrial and Meeting w/Clients 
Prepare, File Amended Scheduling Order; 
telephone conference w/Judge Bohling's Clerk, D. 
Scofield; Ltr. to Scofield 
690.00 
240.00 
225.00 1 
15.00 | 
37.50 | 
150.00 | 
225.00 | 
1,350.00 
525.00 I 
37.50 | 
75.00 I 
150.00 I 
225.00 | 
37.50 | 
225.00 | 
75.00 I 
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08-19-99 
08-19-99 
09-07-99 
09-09-99 
09-09-99 
09-10-99 
10-06-99 
10-13-99 
01-11-00 
11-08-99 
02-09-00 
02-15-00 
02-22-00 
2.9 
0.5 
41.0 
0.5 
0.1 
2.0 
4.5 
0.1 
2.0 
0.1 
1.2 
Prepare Serve Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs 
Interrogatories 
Prepare, Serve Defendants' Responses to Plaintiffs 
Request for Production of Documents 
Research, prepare, File Defendants' Motion and 
Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment 
Prepare Subpoena Duces Tecum on Tracey 
Kartsone 
Service of Process Fee (Kartsone) 
Review Ltr. from Heather Patno, Legal Asst., 
Plaintiffs Counsel 
Review Plaintiffs Memorandum in Opposition to 
Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Travel to Logan, Utah, Depose Tracey Kartsone, 
and return to SLC 
Tele. conf. w/Client to discuss Depo. of Dr. Peterson 
Reporter Fee, Transcript Fee, DEPOMAX 
Review Plaintiffs Memorandum in Support of 
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment Against 
Defendants on Defendants' Claims; and Plaintiffs 
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment Against Defendants on 
Plaintiffs Claim 
Tele conf. w/Chents to discuss trial strategy 
Prepare, File Defendants' Response to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs 
Claims 
435.00 
37 50 
6,150.00 
75.00 
7.00 
15.00 I 
300.00 l 
675.00 
15.00 | 
284.40 | 
300.00 I 
15 00 I 
180 00 
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02-22-00 
| 02-22-00 
| 02-23-00 
1 02-23-00 
1 02-28-00 
03-01-00 
03-01-00 
03-01-00 
03-02-00 
03-03-00 
03-03-00 
03-06-00 
03-06-00 
05-15-00 
25 
0 25 
06 
0 25 
01 
2 25 
01 
2 25 
01 
1 75 
50 
91 
26 
Prepare, File Defendant's Response to Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Defendants' 
Claims 
Tele conf w/D Scofield re misc matters 
Prepare, File Motion to Continue Trial Setting 
Prepare, File Defendants' Notice to Submit for 
Decision Their Motion For Partial Summary 
Judgment 
Review Plaintiffs Motion for Enlargement of Time to 
File Exhibit List 
Review Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum re Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants 
On Plaintiffs Claims 
Review Plaintiffs Objection to Defendants' Motion to 
Continue Trial Setting 
Review Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum re Plaintiffs 
Motion for Summary Judgment Against Defendants 
on Defendants' Claims 
Review Plaintiffs Letter to Judge Bohling 
Attorney conf re motions pending and to be argued 
3/6, review former Motions and Affidavits, Review 
Motion to Continue and call to opposing counsel 
Letter to D Scofield re accounting records 
Tape of Hearing 03-06-00 
Prepare for, argue Summary Judgment Motions (2 
attys) 
Draft Order, Findings Granting Defendants' Motion 
for Summary Judgment; Denying Plaintiffs Motion 
for Summary Judgment 
375 00 
37 50 
90 00 
37 50 I 
15 00 I 
337 50 I 
15 00 ] 
337 50 I 
15 00 | 
262 50 I 
75 00 | 
15 00 | 
1,365 00 
390 00 I 
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TOTAL COSTS AND ATTORNEY FEES $22,453.90 
FURTHER AFFIANT SAITH NOT. 
DATED this 5TH day of July, 2000. 
/S/JAMES C,HASK)N$ 
James C. Haskins 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 5TH day of July, 2000. 
/S/ JAY L KESSLER 
NOTARY PUBLIC IN AND FOR 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Affidavit of James C. Haskins in Support of 
Motion for Order Allowing Costs and Attorney Fees was served on the 5TH day 
of July, 2000, by mailing the same in a U.S. Postal Service postage paid wrapper 
addressed as follows: 
David W. Scofield 
David J. Burns 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/S/T^QMAmTHQTOQM, 
Thomas N. Thompson 
Page 10 
James C. Haskins (#1406) 
Thomas N. Thompson (#3243) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P.C. 
Attorneys for Defendants 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2827 
Telephone: (801) 539-0234 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, 
a Utah general partnership 
KENNETH C. JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, EARLENE B. 
JENSEN, individually and as 
general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, STEVEN 
K. JENSEN, individually and 
as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, and 
KEVEN J. JENSEN, individually 
and as general partner of 
Wasatch Medical Management, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF DEFENDANTS' MOTION 
FOR ORDER ALLOWING 
COSTS AND 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Civil No. 910901061CN 
Judge William B. Bohling 
Defendants. 
This protracted litigation commenced almost a decade ago when the Plaintiff, 
David L. Orlob brought an action against the Defendants on the theory that the 
Defendants were in breach of the Combined Agreement which was the subject of this 
litigation. Based upon the terms of that Agreement, the Plaintiff also sought an award 
of costs and attorney fees. The Court has now granted summary judgment in favor of 
Defendants with respect to all of the Plaintiffs claims. 
Paragraph 21 of the Combined Agreement provides that the "[p]arties further 
acknowledge that in the event of a default the non-defaulting party shall be entitled to 
all costs, including reasonable attorney fees, to enforce the terms and conditions of this 
Agreement against the defaulting party." The Plaintiff clearly alleged that the 
Defendants were in default of the Agreement and, pursuant to the Court's ruling in this 
case, the Defendants clearly qualify as "non-defaulting part[ies]" in this litigation. 
Additionally, the Defendants prevailed as to each and every one of the claims raised by 
the Plaintiff. Accordingly, they should be permitted to recover their costs and attorney 
fees in this action. Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56.5, attorney fees are properly 
recoverable under any written contract whenever it "allow[s] at least one party to 
recover attorney's fees." The Defendants have incurred over $20,000.00 defending 
against the spurious claims of the Plaintiff. 
Because the issue of attorney fees is generally ancillary to the underlying 
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causes of action, that issue cannot be decided until after one party or the other has 
"prevailed" in the litigation. Meadowbrook, LLC v. Flower, 959 P.2d 115, 118 (Utah 
1998). A trial court has broad discretion in determining what constitutes reasonable 
attorney fees, and that determination may not be reversed in the absence of an abuse 
of discretion. Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). 
In Utah, attorney fees are appropriate when they are provided for in a written 
contract. American Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Systems Communication Corp., 939 P.2d 185 
(Utah App. 1997); Stewart v. Utah Public Service Commission, 885 P.2d 759, 782 (Utah 
1994). "Where a contract provides the 'right to attorney fees, Utah courts have 
allowed the party who successfully prosecuted or defended against a claim to recover 
the fees attributable to those claims on which the party was successful.'" Dejavue, Inc. 
v. U.S. Energy Corporation, 993 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah App. 1999). 
Because the Defendants prevailed on each and every one of the Plaintiffs 
claims in this case, and because the Combined Agreement makes express provision for 
attorney fees in favor of the "non-defaulting party," it is respectfully submitted that the 
Defendants should be permitted to recover their costs and attorney fees in this action. 
DATED this 5TH day of July, 2000. 
/$/JAMES C HAS W $ 
James C. Haskins 
Attorney for Defendants 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Defendants 
Motion for Order Allowing Costs and Attorney Fees was served on the 5TH day 
of July, 2000, by mailing the same in a U.S. Postal Service postage paid wrapper 
addressed as follows: 
David W. Scofield 
David J. Burns 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
185 South State Street, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
/S/ THOMAS N. THOMPSON 
Thomas N. Thompson 
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ADDENDUM 2 
David W. Scofield 4140 
Ronald F. Price 5535 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
310 South Main, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City; Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 363-4300 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. ORLOB, 
Plaintiff, 
: AMENDED COMPLAINT 
-vs- : 
WASATCH MEDICAL MANAGEMENT, : Civil No. 910901061CN 
a Utah general partnership : 
KENNETH C. JENSEN, individually : 
and as general partner of Wasatch : 
Medical Management, EARLENE B. : Judge Rokich 
JENSEN, individually and as : 
general partner of Wasatch : 
Medical Management, STEVEN : 
K. JENSEN, individually and : 
as general partner of Wasatch 
Medical Management, and : 
KEVIN J. JENSEN, individually : 
and as general partner of : 
Wasatch Medical Management, : 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiff, by and through his undersigned counsel, for causes of action against the 
defendants, alleges as follows: 
M -^
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. Professional's Control Group, Inc. ("PCG") is a Utah Corporation that 
formerly did business in Salt Lake County, Utah. At all times relevant hereto, plaintiff 
David L. Orlob ("Orlob") was the president and principal shareholder of PCG. 
2. On or about August 31, 1988, PCG, Orlob individually, Wasatch Medical 
Management ("Wasatch"), and defendants Kenneth C. Jensen, Earlene B. Jensen, Steven 
K. Jensen and Kevin J. Jensen (hereinafter collectively referred to as the "Jensens"), 
individually and in their representative capacities as general partners of Wasatch, entered 
into an agreement entitled "Combined Agreement" ("Agreement"), pursuant to which PCG 
agreed to transfer the assets of PCG to Wasatch and the Jensens, in exchange for, inter 
alia, the promise of certain payments to Orlob, individually. A true and correct copy of 
the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A." 
3. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, Orlob executed the Agreement 
individually. See Exhibit "A." 
4. On or about October 25, 1990, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS"), issued 
a Form 668-B Levy ("Levy") for taxes allegedly due and owing from PCG. A true and 
correct copy of the Levy is attached hereto as Exhibit "B." I 
5. On or about November 14, 1990, a seizure was conducted by the IRS 
pursuant to which the IRS seized PCG's interest in the Agreement. 
6. On or about November 26, 1990, the IRS noticed a public auction pursuant 
to which auction the IRS gave notice it intended to sell PCG's interest in the Agreement. 
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See Notice of Public Auction Sale ("Notice of Sale"), a true and correct copy which is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "C." 
7. The Notice of Sale provides, inter alia, that "only the right, title, and interest 
of Professionars Control Group in and to the [Combined Agreement] will be offered for 
sale." See Exhibit "C" (emphasis added). 
8. On or about December 10,1990, the IRS held the referenced public auction 
and, upon information and belief, the Jensens purchased PCG's interest in the Agreement 
at that auction. 
9. The Notice of Sale specifically provides that only PCG's interest in the 
Agreement was being sold at the referenced auction. Accordingly, Orlob's interest in the 
Agreement was not purchased by the Jensens and the Jensens' purchase of PCG's interest 
in the Agreement did not extinguish or otherwise affect Orlob's interest in the Agreement. 
COUNTI 
10. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 9 are incorporated herein 
in their entirety. 
11. Utah Code Annotated § 78-33-2 provides: 
Any person interested under a deed, will or written contract, where his 
rights, status or other legal relations are affected by a statute, municipal 
ordinance, contract or franchise, may have determined any question of 
construction or validity arising under the instrument, statute, ordinance, 
contract or franchise, and obtain a declaration of rights, status of other legal 
relations thereunder. 
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12. As set forth above, Orlob is a party to the Agreement in his individual 
capacity. The Jensens' purchase of PCG's interest in the Agreement has no affect upon 
Orlob's interest and Orlob's interest in the Agreement continues to be of full force and 
effect. 
13. Upon information and belief, defendants dispute that Orlob is a party 
individually to the Agreement and contend that they have purchased any and all interests 
of both PCG and Orlob in the Agreement. 
14. Orlob is entitled, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-33-2, to a declaration 
of his rights under the Agreement, to a declaration that Orlob is a party individually to 
the Agreement, that defendants' purchased only PCG's interest in the Agreement, that 
defendants did not purchase Orlob's interest in the Agreement, and that defendants 
purchase of PCG's interest in the Agreement does not extinguish, reduce or otherwise 
affect Orlob's interest in the Agreement. 
15. Defendants' refusal to comply with the terms of the Agreement and refusal 
to recognize Orlob's interest in the Agreement is not made in good faith. Accordingly, 
Orlob is entitled to recover all costs and attorneys' fees incurred in bringing and 
maintaining this action. j 
COUNTn 
16. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 15 above are 
incorporated herein in their entirety. 
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17. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, defendants agreed to make specific 
payments of money on a monthly basis to Orlob as consideration for, inter alia, a non-
competition covenant for Orlob. Orlob has performed all of his obligations under the 
Agreement. 
18. Defendants have defaulted in their payment of monies under the Agreement 
and, as of the date of this complaint, are indebted to Orlob in the amount not less than 
Four Hundred Fifty Thousand Dollars ($450,000), or such other and greater amounts as 
may be proven at trial 
19. Paragraph 21 of the Agreement provides that "in the event of a default, the 
non-defaulting party shall be entitled to all costs, including reasonable attorneys' fees, to' 
enforce the terms and conditions of this Agreement against the defaulting party." 
Therefore, Orlob is entitled to all costs, expenses and attorneys' fees incurred in bringing 
and maintaining this action. COUNT HI 
20. The allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 19 above are 
incorporated herein in their entirety. 
21. The Agreement expressly provides that Orlob "shall have reasonable access 
at reasonable times to audit all accounting records to verify payments and calculations." 
See Agreement, at SI 17. Thus, Orlob is entitled to an accounting of all monies received 
by defendants, directly or indirectly, in connection with the Agreement. 
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22. In addition to the accounting, Orlob is entitled to recover all costs, expenses 
nd attorneys' fees incurred in connection with bringing and maintaining this action. See 
Agreement at f 21. 
PRAYER FOR RELIEF 
WHEREFORE, plaintiff demands judgment in his favor and against defendants 
mitly and severally as follows: 
1. For a determination of Orlob's rights under the Agreement, and for a 
ieclaration that Orlob is a party individually to the Agreement, that the Jensens | 
rarchased only PCG's interest in the Agreement, that defendants' purchase of PCG's 
nterest in the Agreement has not extinguished Orlob's interest in the Agreement and that j 
Mob's interest in the Agreement remains and continues to be of full force and effect. | 
2. For damages for breach of contract in an amount to be proven at trial, but j 
R no event less than $450,000.00. 
3. For an accounting of all monies received by defendants, directly or] 
^directly, as a result of or in connection with the Agreement. 
4. For plaintiffs costs, reasonable attorneys' fees and expenses as allowed by 
he Agreement and applicable law. 
5. For prejudgment interest. 
6. For such other and further relief as the court deems just, equitable and 
roper in the premises. 
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DATED this ± day of January, 1993. 
PARSONS, DAVIES, KINGHORN & PETERS 
Ronald F. Price 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
David L. Orlob 
PLAINTIFFS ADDRESS: 
3045 South Bentley Avenue 
Los Angeles, California 90034 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED 
COMPLAINT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the following this # day of January, 
1993: 
Wasatch Medical Management 
2340 East Phylden Drive 
HolladayUT 84117 
ATT: Steven K. Jensen 
Kevin J. Jensen 
1821 Edgemont Circle 
Sandy UT 84092 
Earlene B. Jensen 
3048 North 300 East 
North OgdenUT 84404 
Kenneth C. Jensen 
3048 North 300 East 
North OgdenUT 84404 
Steven K. Jensen 
1816 East 3900 South 
Salt Lake City Ut 84124 
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RFP.TRANSFER 
8 
